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Algorithms, in both the broad and narrow senses of the word, affect prac-
tically every aspect of our daily lives. Algorithms decide which advertisements
are shown on media such as Youtube (and sometimes get it wrong, causing pro-
ducers of material to receive income from advertisements appearin with their
material, when the advertisers would never consciously approve that material
[Gua17], often causing public anger [Bir17, for example]), what prices we are
quoted for airline flights [MPR09], and, in the USA, whether people get bail
[ALMK16].
The House of Commons Select Committee on Science & Technology launched
an inquiry into “algorithms in decision-making” on 28 February 2017. Both
the Institute for Mathematics and its Applications and BCS, the Chartered
Institute for IT, submitted evidence, with the writing process coordinated by
the author. The vote on April 19th for an early General Election terminated
the inquiry: all submissions can be viewed at http://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-technology-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry9/publications/. The aim
of this article is to draw together the evidence and general points made in these
submissions.
1 Background on Algorithms
The word algorithm has, particularly in American but creeping into British
English, acquired a wider connotation than the OED definition: “a precisely
defined set of mathematical or logical operations for the performance of a par-
ticular task”. For example, Merriam–Webster has “set of rules a machine (and
especially a computer) follows to achieve a particular goal”. Hence we drew
various distinctions to help the Committee, and the reader.
1.1 Proclaimed or Inferred (from data)
A classic example of a proclaimed algorithm is Income Tax: if (for a given set of
circumstances) your net income is X, you pay f(X) in income tax, where f is
1
laid down in the Finance Act. A classic example of an inferred algorithm is the
“wind chill”, which is an algorithm with a precise mathematical statement, but
was experimentally determined by the multinational JAG/TI group of scientists.
Much of the current trend in “machine learning” is for a computer, sometimes
using a well-understood meta-algorithm to produce an “algorithm” without a
precise mathematical statement, but based on a large amount of experimental
data, generally referred to as “training data”. Most of these algorithms op-
erate on data, often training or other background data (database) as well as
foreground data (the question). They are at most as good as the background
data they operate with, and bad data can lead to disastrously wrong results, as
when the London Ambulance Service did not know where the Velodrome was.
[Gua16]
1.2 Published or secretly understood, or not understood
Income tax, and wind chill, are published algorithms. Many companies operat-
ing in regulated industries, generally in finance, have secret algorithms for credit
scoring, loan approval etc. These algorithms are part of their competitive edge.
Yet, they need to be able to explain them to regulators, and to justify decisions
if required. An example might be a car insurance company, whose algorithm
might include the step “To the base premium, we add a sum depending on the
insured’s occupation, from this table”, where the table is computed based on
past claims data. The table, the precise definition of occupations, and indeed
whether it’s adding a sum, multiplying by a ratio, or both, are part of the
insurer’s trade secrets. This example in insurance long predates the use of com-
puters, never mind machine learning algorithms, but the advent of technology
has permitted much more analysis and the use of many more factors. Equally, it
has enabled the use of much more precise calculations, rather than “gut feel” to
populate these tables. Conversely, many of the algorithms produced by machine
learning, notably those based on “deep learning”, are not understood at all.
1.3 Advisory or Determinative
The income tax algorithm determines the amount payable: it is not a suggestion
to the tax inspector how much to charge. University degree classifications have
become more determinative over the years. A recent adoption of a determinative
algorithm is the Duckworth-Lewis algorithm [DL98] in cricket. The algorithm
is public, and understood by experts, but not by the general public, who just
accept it.
Advisory algorithms produce a piece of advice to a human being who makes
an ultimate decision. This may consist of evaluating several different scenarios,
or may just be a simple “answer”. These answers may or may not (in practice,
far too often do not) have some measure of confidence attached. Of course, an
algorithm may in principle only be advisory but the human beings using it may
in practice just rubber-stamp its “advice”, so in practice it’s determinative.
In the US case of Paul Zilly [ALMK16], defence and prosecution had agreed
a plea bargain of a year in prison, but the judge looked at a recidivism score
produced by a proprietary (and at least secret, probably not understood), over-
turned the plea deal, and imposed a two-year sentence. In theory that was an
advisory algorithm, but in practice it was being used to overrule the agreement
which would have been rubber-stamped by the judge.
The GDPR (Article 22.1) applies to a “decision based solely on automated
processing”, i.e. a determinative algorithm. The relevant Recital (71) is less
clear, and one might expect a lot of litigation where humans are rubber-stamping
a decision that is in theory only advisory1.
1.4 Continuous or Discrete
Many algorithms are used that yield numerical results varying continuously with
their input. So if you earn £10 more, you pay £2 (or £4 or . . . ) in income tax,
and £20 more is twice that (unless you cross a threshold) and so on. If the wind
speed increases by 1 km/h, then the wind chill changes by a certain amount.
Other algorithms, particularly machine learning “classifier” algorithms give one
of a small number of discrete results, e.g. degree classification. In many cases
the answer is binary: bail or no bail; (referral for) melanoma or not. For a
continuous algorithm, a small error in the inputs should result in a small error
in the answer, whereas for a discrete algorithm, even the smallest error in the
inputs may result in a different answer. If we understand the algorithm, we can
consider the question “how close are we to a boundary”, and possibly act on
this information. For example, a university department might adopt (and some
do) a rule that if a student fails by 1% or less, the scripts should be checked
again. But if all we have is a black box that outputs decisions, we cannot ask
this question.
1.5 Effect on people
It is a truism that every decision has consequences. The main concern is determi-
native (either de facto or de jure) algorithms making decisions that significantly
affect people’s lives. Examples would include medical diagnosis, mortgage ap-
provals and [in the USA] granting or otherwise of bail, and possibly sentencing.
However, there are also effects on people’s prospects (being shortlisted for jobs),
finances, e.g. gender discrimination in insurance, which in theory is illegal, but
can be perpetuated through use of gender-correlated data, and other important
aspects.
1Post-submission note: The Alan Turing Institute submission (number 73) claims that
there is no “Right of Explanation”, but that was not the consensus at the NYU Conference on
Algorithms and Explanations: http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/ili/events/algorithms-
and-explanations.
1.6 Data
Any inferred algorithm is based on data. In the case of a scientific experiment,
where the algorithm is often called a Law, as in Boyle’s Law, one expects the
experiment to the reproduced, and these repeat experiments to confirm the
algorithms. In the case of other fields, the nature of the data is more variable.
The term “ground truth” is used to refer to absolute facts, such as “this skin
lesion is a melanoma”, or “this person did not offend while on bail”, whereas
we use “proxy data” to refer to what is actually used as the training data, “did
a dermatologist diagnose skin cancer” or “did a bail judge refuse bail [on the
grounds of likelihood of re-offending]”. Clearly ground truth is better, but it
may be too difficult, or even impossible, to obtain. The study in [GKW+90]
(which deduces that dermatologists have a 64% accuracy rate, but a sensitivity
of over 80%) was very rare in actually conducting biopsies on patients with a
negative diagnosis by the dermatologist, so that we have ground truth. In many
circumstances it may be impossible, e.g. we can’t obtain “did this person [who
was bailed] offend while on bail”, merely “was this person [who was bailed]
caught offending while on bail”. This may seem pedantic, but note that we
can’t obtain the opposite datum “would this person [who was not bailed] have
been caught offending while on bail had he been released.
This use of background data to derive an algorithm has two important conse-
quences. The first is that any biases in the background data will be perpetuated
in the algorithm. The second is that we have no guarantee at all that the algo-
rithm produced will remain valid outside the range of those data. This means
that every such algorithm needs to be traceable back to the background data
that produced it.
2 Uses of Algorithms
Although well-known to many readers, we thought it important to draw Parlia-
ment’s attention to various existing uses.
2.1 QE aircraft carrier
The business case for the QE Carrier drew heavily on the Cost Capability Trade
Off Model, which uses a variety of modern algorithmic techniques such as Hybrid
Model of Non-Linear Regression, Optimisation, Monte-Carlo Simulation and
Design of Experiment in order to forecast the optimum performance within bud-
getary constraints. It is a mixture of proclaimed and experimental, is the com-
pany’s intellectual property, but was explained to the customer, and was advi-
sory, exploring a variety of scenarios. See [CP16] and http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/education/stem-awards/stem-hq/the-beauty-of-maths/.
2.2 Scheduling etc.
Linear Programming, and its generalisation Mixed-Integer Programming, are
used, generally as determinative algorithms, in practically every sector [Bix15,
slide 18] The specification of the algorithm is public, even though the details of
what makes it fast (not what the answer is, which is defined by the specification)
are trade secrets. It is also an area in which the algorithmic advances are even
greater than hardware advances, to the point where you would be better off
running todays software on 1991 computers than vice versa [Bix15, slide 37].
For example, a supermarket chain would use Mixed-Integer Programming to
decide how many lorries to send from each warehouse to each (delivery run
of) supermarket(s), carrying which goods, to meet the order plan. If it used
an independent haulage firm, that firm would use Mixed-Integer Programming
to schedule the drivers and vehicles, and so on, and again this would be a
determinative algorithm.
2.3 Online Advertising
Nowhere is commerce using opaque machine-learning algorithms more than in
the Internet itself: algorithms determine what search engines return, what ad-
vertisements are shown to human beings, what advertisements are shown next to
which content (which has caused controversy recently) and so on. It is probable
that none of these activities are intentionally (on the part of the designers of the
algorithms) biased, but in practice they are [DTD15, §6.1]. These algorithms
are determinative.
3 “biases or discrimination”?
The Committee asked, and it’s a very natural question, whether the use of
“algorithms” can eliminate, introduce or amplify biases or discrimination, and
whether this can be detected, and in a transparent and accountable way, and
what the implications of increased transparency are.
Firstly, it must be noted that ‘biases or discrimination’ are human percep-
tions of a process, and what is, or is not, discrimination depends on society, and
changes over time. Consider, for example, the recent ruling about gender bias
in insurance, where what had been a common, and public, industry practice,
was suddenly declared to be a bias. It’s also a very nebulous question when
pushed to precise specification, as doing something algorithmically requires.
3.1 Eliminate Bias
If the algorithm is known and fully understood, it is possible to assert that it is
no more biased than the data fed into it, and should produce the same output
on identical input. New algorithms for combining panelists’ scores [MKLP17]
could be used for many decision-making processes, e.g. the Research Excellence
Framework, and would improve the openness of the decision-making. If the al-
gorithm is not known and fully understood, it is only possible to eliminate those
biases which are known about and checked for, and then only if the algorithm
has the appropriate mathematical properties, e.g. linearity.
Most such “machine learning algorithms” are not understood at all: no hu-
man being can say “why” the algorithm does what it does, nor can predict what
it will do on data which are not the training data [Kni17]. Even strong advo-
cates of these admit this major weakness. “Although D[eep] N[eural] N[etwork]s
have demonstrated tremendous effectiveness at a wide range of tasks, when they
fail, they often fail spectacularly, producing unexplainable and incoherent re-
sults that can leave one to wonder what caused the DNN to make such decisions.
The lack of transparency in the decision-making process of DNNs is a significant
bottleneck in their widespread adoption in industry, such as healthcare, defence,
cybersecurity, etc., where the error tolerance is very low and the ability to in-
terpret, understand, and trust decisions is critical.” [KWT17]. We noted that
the research in that paper, though good, is only looking at specific mistakes,
and answering questions like “why did the DNN misclassify this Chihuahua as
a Shih-Tzu”, and not “how does the DNN recognise Chihuahuas”.
3.2 Introduce Bias
It is certainly possible to introduce biases through an algorithmic process, just
as it is possible to do so through a manual process. As pointed out [ALMK16],
it is possible for such processes to be biased by considering things that human
beings would refuse to consider publicly: the system used in Broward County
Florida asks “Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?”, while it’s
hard to imagine a judge accepting the prosecution argument “the defendant
deserves a harsher sentence because his father went to prison”.
Consider, again, insurance, more specifically car insurance. It is no longer
legal to discriminate on the basis of gender. It is, currently, legal to discriminate
on the basis of occupation, even though some occupations are predominantly
occupied by one gender, giving rise to indirect discrimination [McD15].
3.3 Amplify Bias
If one can introduce a bias, one can certainly amplify it. But there is an effect
(“uncertainty bias”) by which an unbiased algorithm can become biased by
considering factors that are not uniformly distributed, and this bias can grow
over time as an “active learning” algorithm learns and reinforces its bias [GF16].
3.4 Detection of Bias
Currently, detecting bias relies on human effort, sometimes aided itself by ma-
chine learning. We have quoted various instances of bias, but these are merely
those that researchers have chosen to investigate. Direct bias, e.g. highly-paid
jobs being offered to explicitly male searchers [DTD15] can be obviated by search
engines never taking gender into account (but this is highly improbable), but
even so this would not eliminate indirect bias [McD15].
3.5 Transparent and Accountable Way
Many of the most efficient algorithms for certain tasks are not transparent or
accountable. It is, with the current state of technology, impossible to understand
how a typical neural net reaches its decisions. Though the state of technology
may change, it is currently the case that only algorithms which can be reduced
to a (possibly complex) formula, can be understood, and even then possibly
only by experts.
3.6 The implications of increased transparency
The background data should have been thoroughly anonymised (easier said
than done). The foreground data should be subject to the usual data protec-
tion rules. There is a real challenge with “active learning” algorithms, where
today’s foreground data becomes tomorrow’s background data. To the best of
our knowledge, no satisfactory research has been carried out here.
An issue that has received very little attention (but see [MKWH16]) is the
interaction between “the right to be forgotten” and machine learning. If X
exercises his right to be forgotten, does/should Y ’s insurance premium change?
4 Bad practice
We were actually asked for examples of good practice, but couldn’t really find
any in the machine learning area. We did want to warn about examples of bad
practice.
4.1 Correlation versus Causation
Though this error is warned about in most statistics courses, confusing ‘corre-
lation’, which is what algorithms, machine learning or otherwise, can detect,
with ‘causality’, which is what people are generally interested in, is still com-
mon. Consider [Gri16, page 16], the example of “Screen time [at 14 years] was
associated with lower academic performance [at 16 years]”. Media reporting
generally converted correlation into causality, as in “programmes aimed at re-
ducing screen time could have important benefits for teenagers’ exam grades”,
whereas increased screen time might be an early indicator of poor performance,
and the investment should be in coaching/catching up.
4.2 Training versus Testing Data
Many machine learning protocols require splitting the background data into
training and testing data. However, it is bad practice to believe that this split
is in any way significant. At the very least, this process should be repeated
several times, known as crossvalidation. The state of the art is not yet able to
give good guidelines for “several”.
5 Recommendations
Both societies made several recommendations to Government, many of which
will be obvious to readers. The full set of recommendations are in the submis-
sions. Key ones were the following.
1. The Government, and all its agencies and subcontractors, including re-
cruitment agencies, need to review as a matter of urgency the use of all
automatic processing to ensure it:
(a) Is only based on legitimate personal data of the individual;
(b) Carries a precise description of any training data it was built from;
(c) Has been tested for indirect discrimination;
(d) Is capable of being explained in line with GDPR 15.1(h). In partic-
ular, buzzphrases like “Artificial Intelligence”, “deep learning algo-
rithm”, “data-based algorithm” should act as warning signs that the
“algorithm” is in fact probably no more than unscientific reasoning
by generalisation
2. No data should be fed to an algorithm, determinative or advisory, that
would not be acceptable in an equivalent manual process: see the Zilly
case above and [ALMK16].
3. In machine learning algorithms, the background data contribute to the
decision, so every such algorithm should be prominently labelled with the
data that created it, both as a statement the lay person can understand
(e.g. “based on London traffic data 1982-2002”) and question (“but that
was before the congestion charge”), and ultimately such that an expert
can analyse it. This is an algorithmic consequence of the 15.1(h) right.
6 Conclusions
The roˆle of the “traditional” algorithm, whether proclaimed or inferred, is great
and growing (possibly not as fast as it should), whether in government or else-
where. However, there is a need to be cautious when endowing the “algorithms”
produced by many forms of machine learning, which humans, even experts, do
not understand, with determinative (either de facto or de jure) powers that
affect people, individually or as society, in non-trivial ways.
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